Studying organisational cultures and their effects on safety by Hopkins, Andrew
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper 44: 
Studying Organisational Cultures  
and their Effects on Safety 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Andrew Hopkins 
Professor of Sociology 
Faculty of Arts and National Research Centre for OHS 
Regulation 
Australian National University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper prepared for presentation to the 
International Conference on Occupational Risk Prevention 
Seville, May 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
 
 
About the Centre 
The National Research Centre for Occupational Health and Safety Regulation is 
a research centre within the Regulatory Institutions Network (RegNet), in the 
Research School of Social Sciences, at the Australian National University. The 
Centre is funded by the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission 
(NOHSC). 
The aims of the Centre are to: 
• conduct and facilitate high quality empirical and policy-focused research into 
OHS regulation, consistent with the National OHS Strategy; 
• facilitate and promote groups of collaborating researchers to conduct 
empirical and policy-focused research into OHS regulation in each of the 
States and Territories; 
• facilitate the integration of research into OHS regulation with research 
findings in other areas of regulation; 
• produce regular reports on national and international developments in OHS 
regulation; 
• develop the research skills of young OHS researchers; and  
• assist in the development of the skills and capacities of staff of the NOHSC 
Office. 
In order to achieve these aims the Centre undertakes research, supports a 
consortium of OHS regulation researchers in Australia, assists in the 
development of skills and capacities of staff of NOHSC staff and collaborates in 
research programs with other Australian and international researchers and 
research centres. 
Address for correspondence: 
National Research Centre for Occupational Health and Safety Regulation 
Regulatory Institutions Network (RegNet) 
Second Floor, Coombs Extension 
The Australian National University 
Canberra ACT 0200 
Ph (02) 6125 1514 Fax (02) 6125 1507 
Email nrcohsr@anu.edu.au 
Web http://ohs.anu.edu.au
 2
 
 
Abstract 
 
How do organisational cultures influence safety? To answer this question 
requires a strategy for investigating organisational culture. There are 
various research strategies available. By far the most widely used is the 
perception survey. An alternative is for researchers is to immerse 
themselves in one or more organisations, making detailed observations 
about activities and drawing inferences about the nature of the 
organisation’s culture (the ethnographic method). A third technique 
makes use of the wealth of material that is assembled by inquiries into 
major accidents. This paper describes how this material can be used to 
provide insights into organisational cultures. It draws on specific 
examples from the author’s own work as well as the cultural analysis 
carried out by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. It concludes 
with some additional suggestions for carrying out research on safety-
relevant aspects of organisational culture. 
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Introduction 
 
Despite all that has been written about safety culture, there is no agreement about just 
what this concept means. The titles of various journal articles allude to this uncertainty, 
for example, “culture’s confusions”1 and “safety culture: philosopher’s stone or man of 
straw?”2 It is not the purpose of this article to outline these problems, but one crucial 
ambiguity should be noted. For some writers, every organisation has a safety culture of 
some sort, which can be described as strong or weak, positive or negative. For other 
writers, only an organisation which has an over-riding commitment to safety can be 
said to have a safety culture. On this view, relatively few organisations have safety 
cultures. As Reason puts it, “like a state of grace, a safety culture is something that is 
striven for but rarely attained”3. The fact that this very basic contradiction has not been 
resolved is but one indicator of the confusion which surrounds the use of this term.  
 
This paper bypasses some of the confusion by shifting attention to the concept 
organisational culture. This is a more general and in some respects a clearer concept. 
Every organisation has a culture (or perhaps a series of subcultures) and that culture can 
be expected to impact on safety. Understanding how this happens can provide insights 
into ways organisational cultures need to be modified to give a higher priority to safety. 
Distinguishing safety from culture in this way breaks the safety research task into two 
components – the study of organisational cultures and the study of the impact of these 
cultures on safety. This paper is largely concerned with the first of these – the study of 
organisational culture. This is in a sense a prior question; we must first identify and 
describe various elements of the culture of an organisation before we can evaluate their 
impact on safety. 
 
Although clearer than safety culture, organisational culture has itself been defined in a 
variety of ways. Schein provides a useful summary of the way the concept of culture 
has been used by various writers: observed behavioural regularities, group norms, 
espoused values, formal philosophy, rules of the game, climate, embedded skills, habits 
of thinking, shared meanings and root metaphors4. It will be noted that some of these 
usages focus on values and attitudes as the key element of culture, while others stress 
behaviour. Cooper sees this as the crucial distinction. “The main difference between 
such definitions (he says) appears to reside in their focus on the way people think, or on 
the way people behave”5.  
 
Perhaps the best known definition of organisational culture, “the way we do things 
around here” 6, is clearly behaviour focussed. Schein himself has at times referred to 
organisational culture simply as “the way we do things around here”7, although his 
formal definition is more complex. Moreover Hofstede, after discussing whether it is 
better to focus on values or practices in defining organisational culture, concludes that 
“shared perceptions of daily practices should be considered to be the core of an 
organisation’s culture”8  
 
It should be stressed that definitions in terms of values, on one hand, and practices, on 
the other, are not necessarily in conflict in the way that the alternative definitions of 
safety culture are. It is simply a question of emphasis. “The way we do things around 
here” carries with it the connotation that this is the right, or appropriate or accepted 
way to do things. These judgments stem necessarily from shared assumptions or values. 
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To reiterate, a definition in terms of practices does not deny the importance of values in 
any complete understanding of culture. 
 
A further preliminary matter that must be mentioned is the relationship of culture to 
climate. Various writers argue that there are conceptual differences. For instance it is 
said that climate is a manifestation of culture9, that climate is directly measurable while 
culture is too abstract to be measured directly10, and that climate refers to the situation 
at a particular point in time while culture refers to more enduring phenomena11. Some 
writers see climate as referring to attitudes and culture to behaviour12.  
 
However, even writers who argue for a conceptual distinction recognize that those 
carrying out empirical research on safety climate or safety culture have been unable or 
unwilling to make these distinctions and that in practice the terms appear to be used 
interchangeably. Guldenmund suggests that the difference between climate and culture 
may be little more than terminological fashion. He notes that in 1970s people doing 
research on these topics tended to use the term climate but that gradually, during the 
1980s, climate was replaced by culture.13  
 
It is also observed that the terms have arisen in different academic disciplines: climate 
in social psychology and culture in anthropology. As a result they tend to be associated 
with the different research strategies of these disciplines, respectively questionnaire 
research and ethnography. This, however, does not amount to a conceptual distinction 
between the two ideas, for there is no reason why a single concept cannot be studied 
using a variety of research strategies. For present purposes therefore I shall treat 
organisational climate and organisational culture as synonymous. 
 
While the distinction between culture and climate remains elusive, what is clear is that 
there are real choices to be made in terms of research strategy. While a single concept 
can in principle be investigated using more than one research method, those methods 
have different strengths and weaknesses and can be expected to yield different insights. 
I turn, therefore, to this question of research strategies. 
 
Culture surveys  
 
The survey method appears to be the predominant strategy for studying organisational 
cultures and their effect on safety. There are numerous reports in the literature of safety 
culture or safety climate surveys. Questionnaires are administered to individuals and 
the data aggregated to the workplace or organisational level. This facilitates statements 
about organisations and comparisons of one organisation with another.  
 
The survey method is well suited to studying individual attitudes and values and it 
might be thought that the method is thereby biased in favour of a definition of culture in 
these terms. However, the survey method is equally suited to studying practices, or “the 
way we do things around here”. The only qualification is that survey research of “the 
way we do things around” here necessarily measures people’s perceptions rather than 
what actually happens, which may not necessarily coincide. Hofstede provides an 
excellent demonstration of such an approach14. He asked respondents to indicate the 
extent to which they agreed with statements such as: “Where I work, meeting times are 
kept very punctually”; and “Where I work, quantity prevails over quality”. A total of 61 
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such questions was asked, the results factor analysed and six mutually independent 
dimensions identified: 
 
process oriented vs results oriented; 
employee oriented vs job oriented; 
parochial vs professional;  
open system vs closed system; 
loose control vs tights control;  
normative vs pragmatic. 
 
The twenty organisational units studied were then able to be compared in terms of these 
six cultural dimensions. Hofstede does not correlate these variations with safety 
performance but one can easily envisage a study that does. 
 
This example demonstrates a couple of related points. First, it shows that surveys can 
be used to study organisational practices, as well as attitudes. Second, as noted above, 
scholars seeking to identify a difference between organisational culture and 
organisational climate sometimes argue that the difference lies in the research methods 
used. Guldenmund for instance argues that organisational climate studies typically use 
self-administered questionnaires that are analysed in quantitative fashion, while studies 
of organisational culture are typically carried out by participant observation and do not 
lead to quantitative results15. Hofstede’s work shows that this is not an invariable rule, 
for it is explicitly a study of organisational culture yet is just as quantitative and 
mathematically sophisticated as research which purports to investigate organisational 
climate.  
 
The survey method does however have its drawbacks. It provides a relatively 
superficial description of the culture of an organisation. Many practices are too 
complex to be meaningfully described in the words of a survey question. Moreover the 
survey method tells us very little about dynamic processes - how the organisation goes 
about solving its problems. This is an important limitation. Consider, for a moment, 
Westrum’s definition of organisational culture as “the organisation’s pattern of 
response to the problems and opportunities it encounters”16. A moment’s thought will 
reveal that this is not inconsistent with the definitions of culture provided above, but it 
does emphases a dynamic element of culture that surveys have great difficulty 
capturing. Schein makes a similar point when he notes that members of a culture are 
most likely to reveal themselves when they have problems to solve and he says that 
research findings “will often be analyses of how the problems were solved not simply 
pure description of cultures”17. This is where the ethnographic method has much to 
contribute. 
 
Ethnography 
 
Ethnographic research originates in the discipline of anthropology where researchers 
immerse themselves for long periods in the culture of interest and provide detailed 
qualitative descriptions of what they observe18. Anthropologists have usually studied 
small scale non-industrial societies. Sociology is distinguished from anthropology 
principally by its focus on contemporary industrial society and it uses many of the same 
methods and theories as anthropology. In particular, sociology has used the 
ethnographic method to study organisations and their cultures19. The ethnographic 
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study of an organisation will not normally require the researcher to live within the 
organisation (except perhaps for what sociologists call total institutions, such as the 
military, prisons and mental hospitals20), but it does require the researcher to spend a 
great deal of time in the organisation, either as a participant observer, for instance an 
employee, or as non-participant observer of some sort.  
 
Of course it is not only sociologists who do this kind of research. Some of the most 
important ethnographic research on organisational culture and its impact on safety, the 
research on high reliability organisations, has been done by political scientists among 
others. They have spend time on aircraft carriers, in nuclear power stations and in air 
traffic control rooms identifying the elements of the cultures of these organisations that 
contribute to reliable operations21.  
 
This approach has also been championed by Schein, originally trained as a 
psychologist. He makes an interesting distinction between the ethnographic model and 
what he calls the clinician/consultant model. Ethnographers seek to minimize their 
impact on the culture under investigation. Organisational clinicians or consultants, on 
the other hand, are called in to solve a problem and to bring about some change. 
Schein, an organisational consultant, is understandably an advocate of the second 
model. He fundamental assumption, he says, is that “one can understand a system best 
by trying to change it … Some of the most important things I learned about (company) 
cultures surfaced only as reactions to some of my interventionists efforts.”22 Schein 
admits however that the distinction between his two models breaks down in practice. 
Even the most scrupulous ethnographer cannot help but affect the culture under study. 
“One’s very presence is an intervention”, he says.23 Both models therefore are 
interventionist. For this reason I shall ignore Schein’s distinction here and describe his 
research as ethnographic24. 
 
While ethnographic research provides a much richer account of the culture of an 
organization that surveys can, a question arises as to the validity of the description 
provided. How can we be sure that the elements of culture identified by the researcher 
are correct? Schein provides an answer to this question. “The accuracy of the depiction 
is ... judged by the credibility of that description to insiders who live in the culture and, 
at the same time, to outsiders who are trying to understand it”25. Most importantly, if 
the members of the culture recognize the description and agree that that is how it is, 
then the researcher can feel reasonably confident in the findings.26
 
One draw back of the ethnographic method is the commitment of time it requires from 
the researcher. It may well be that the only piece of ethnographic work ever carried out 
by a researcher is a PhD. Fortunately, there is another way in which researchers can 
gain access to rich bodies of material about the way organisations operate, without 
engaging in ethnographic field work. 
 
Major accident inquiries 
 
Major accidents, such as rail crashes, space shuttle disasters and petrochemical plant 
explosions where many lives are lost, often give rise to multi-million dollar inquiries. 
These are a priceless source of information about organisational cultures and the way 
they impact on safety. These inquiries may sit for many days taking evidence from a 
large number of people. Inquiry panel members or counsel assisting the inquiry may 
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question individual witnesses for hours. Questioners may pursue numerous lines of 
inquiry, probing, looking for things that might have been overlooked, exploring 
inconstancies and conflicts of evidence, day after day. Proceedings are taped and many 
thousands of pages of transcript evidence are generated. This is far more material than 
an individual researcher engaged in an intensive interview process could ever produce. 
Moreover, the fact that witnesses can be required to give evidence to these inquiries 
and that witnesses can be interrogated in quite hostile fashion means that inquiries can 
gain access to information that no interviewer could ever hope to uncover.  
 
Inquiry reports normally make use of a relatively small amount of this material. 
Moreover, their primary concern is to explain the event in question and only 
secondarily, if at all, to describe the culture of the organisation. As a result the 
transcript provides the researcher with a relatively unexplored data source, a ready 
made set of interview transcripts which can be mined for insights about the culture of 
the organisation. The material is often so rich and so diverse that researchers reading it 
are effectively immersed in the world of that organisation without ever setting foot on 
its premises. Their research amounts to armchair ethnography.  
 
It is of course not possible to provide a complete picture of the culture of an 
organisation using this method. Shein argues that it is never possible to describe an 
entire culture.27 What is possible is to identify what he describes as “elements of the 
culture”, in more concrete terms, groups of practices that hang together in some way. 
 
At least two classic studies of major accidents come close to the research method 
advocated here, but differ in important respects. Turner’s study of several man-made 
disasters allowed him to identify a number of practices which amount to a culture of 
risk denial28. But his study is based on official reports alone and not on the more 
detailed proceedings of the inquiries. A second classic is Vaughan’s study of the 
Challenger space shuttle disaster in 198629. This was quite explicitly a study of 
organisational culture and how it contributed to disaster. She identifies various cultural 
elements including: the normalization of deviance, the culture of production and 
structural secrecy, and she shows how these contributed to the outcome. Her study 
makes use of inquiry transcripts, but more than this, it draws on numerous documents 
created before the event, as well as her own interviews. She describes as an historical 
ethnography30. “My work (she says) was in harmony with the work of many social 
historians and anthropologists who use documents to examine how cultures shape ways 
of thinking”31. Her very extensive sources meant that she was able to study NASA’s 
culture with an intensity that is normally only possible when the researcher works or 
even lives within the culture of interest. Valuable though her method is, it comes at a 
price: Vaughan’s study took her nine years to complete! This is not a price that many 
researchers can afford to pay. 
 
The accident analysis method in action  
 
The potential of the research method advocated above is illustrated by two studies of 
organisational cultures that I have carried out32. The first of these was a study of the 
culture of the rail organisations in the Australian state of New South Wales. It was 
based on the official inquiry into the Glenbrook rail crash. After reading the transcript 
and report I identified four main cultural themes that had contributed to the accident in 
fairly obvious ways. First, the railways were obsessively rule focused, in ways that 
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hindered safety. Second, the railway system was organisationally and occupationally 
fragmented, resulting in a culture of silos33. Third, there was a powerful culture of 
punctuality – on-time-running. Finally, the culture was risk-blind, even risk-denying. 
The last of these elements is very similar to an aspect of organisational culture 
identified by both Turner and Vaughan. Turner’s work was largely about how it is that 
organisations develop cultures of risk denial, while Vaughan talks about NASA’s 
culture as a “way of seeing that is simultaneously a way of not seeing”34. These are 
alternative ways of talking about talking of risk-blindness. A diagrammatic 
representation of the way these cultural elements gave rise to the accident is provided in 
figure 1 (see over page). The diagram shows just how these four cultural elements led 
to the outcome. The details are not relevant here; the diagram is included to indicate the 
importance of the four cultural elements identified in the analysis in explaining this 
accident. 
 
The second study was an official inquiry in which I was a member of the Board. The 
Inquiry was set up to investigate why the Australian Air Force had allowed hundreds of 
aircraft maintenance workers to be poisoned by exposure to toxic chemicals over a 20 
year period. I was in effect the research member of Board and I wrote the report so as 
to highlight the way Air Force values had contributed to this outcome. The following 
five values were identified. First, higher priority was afforded to operations than to 
logistical matters such as maintenance. This was the Air Force equivalent of valuing 
production ahead of safety (Vaughan’s culture of production). Second, there was a “can 
do” attitude, according to which nothing must be allowed to stand in the way of getting 
the job done. (Vaughan talks about the can-do culture at NASA.35) Third, the Air Force 
valued its aircraft more than its people. Fourth, like many airlines, the Air Force valued 
air safety more highly than ground safety. Finally, the command and discipline system, 
to which all defence forces attach great importance, meant that affected workers had no 
way of objecting to their fate. Figure 2 represents the causal analysis carried out by the 
Board of Inquiry. Again, it is included here to demonstrate the centrality of Air Force 
values in the analysis. 
 
The question arises as to how the various cultural themes were identified in these two 
pieces of work. In some cases they were themes that were stressed by witnesses to such 
an extent that they could not be ignored. In the rail case, the focus on making rules and 
blaming rule violators for accidents was referred to constantly, as was the fact that on-
time-running took precedence over safety. In the Air Force matter, only one of the five 
values was explicit in this way – the “can-do” approach to work. Where cultural 
elements were not referred to explicitly by participants they were inferred from the 
stories told and the practices described in testimony. For instance, in the rail accident 
there was no explicit mention by witnesses of a culture of silos, but there were 
numerous comments about organisational fragmentation and occupational isolation and 
their effect on safety. The culture of silos seemed a natural way to draw these ideas 
together, especially given that the phrase “silo mentality” has quite wide currency.  
 
Given that many of these cultural elements are research constructs, not explicitly 
identified by witnesses, how is their validity to be established? How confident can we 
be in these particular ways of grouping and describing the practices revealed in the 
inquiry? Schein addresses this question in relation to elements of culture identified 
using the ethnographic method, and his approach is applicable here. One of his criteria 
is the credibility of the description to those who live within the culture.  
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Figure 1. Causes of the Glenbrook crash (Source: Hopkins, 2005, p77) 
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Figure 2. Causes of damage to Air Force workers’ health (Source: Hopkins, 2005 p109) 
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The Air Force Board of Inquiry had a built in guarantee of credibility from this point of 
view. One of the Board members was a senior Air Force officer. In putting his 
signature to the report he was effectively certifying the validity of the cultural elements 
identified. Here is an example of how it worked. A number of witnesses at the Inquiry 
spoke about the attention paid to air safety. A systematic pattern appeared to be 
emerging of a culture focused on air safety but lacking any focus on the safety of 
maintenance workers. I proposed this to the Air Force member of the Board and he 
recognized it immediately. The priority air safety over ground safety was so ingrained 
in the Air Force, he said, that he was barely conscious of it. Schein notes that deep, 
taken-for-granted assumptions of this nature are the bedrock of culture36. The priority 
of air over ground safety was clearly a bedrock element of air force culture in this 
sense. All other elements of the Air Force culture identified above were similarly 
validated. 
 
My rail research was not integral to the Inquiry in this way. It was done quite 
independently and with no access to insiders who might validate the cultural elements 
that were not explicitly identified by witnesses but that I had inferred. Schein’s second 
criterion of validity is relevant in these circumstances. If the description makes sense to 
outsiders trying to understand the culture, this can be taken as evidence of the validity 
of the description. Outsiders are likely to see the cultural elements as making sense if 
the descriptions draw together the organisational practices identified in the inquiry in a 
natural way and if these descriptions are recognisable or at least plausible based on 
other organisations of which outsiders have some knowledge. From this point of view it 
is ultimately the reader of the research account who makes the judgment as to validity. 
For instance, readers familiar with Vaughan’s comment about the NASA culture as 
providing a way of not seeing, and with other research on cultures of denial will find 
the description of the rail culture as risk-blind or risk-denying to be quite credible. The 
idea of a culture of silos will also strike a chord with many readers familiar with 
management literature. Indeed, the various cultural elements identified were named as 
far as possible so as to facilitate this recognition. As it happens, one of the features of 
high reliability organisations, sensitivity to operations, is the inverse of the silo 
phenomenon. Sensitivity to operations means that front line workers strive to maintain 
as complete a picture as possible of what is going on at any one time. They do not focus 
merely on one aspect of their job, perhaps the most immediate aspect, but seek to be 
aware of all aspects of the operation. This is just the opposite of the limited awareness 
demonstrated by rail workers. The fact that the silo culture turns out to converse of one 
of the elements of the culture of high reliability adds further credence to this 
description.  
 
It should be noted that identifying cultural elements that have contributed to an accident 
involves no automatic judgments about their desirability; there is no presumption that 
these values are necessarily a bad thing. For instance, a culture of on-time-running is 
clearly desirable for rail organisations; it is only when it takes priority over safety that it 
becomes problematic. Similarly a can-do attitude and a command system in which 
orders are obeyed is appropriate for a military organisation, particularly during military 
operations. It is obviously less appropriate in peace-time, non-operational settings. In 
short, identifying elements of organisational culture as contributing to certain undesired 
outcomes does not automatically imply that these values need to be changed. In some 
situations it may be enough to put in place mechanisms to ensure that such features of 
the organisational culture do not operate at the expense of safety. 
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The Columbia space shuttle accident report 
 
The Australia Air Force Inquiry was simultaneously an investigation into what went 
wrong and at the same time an explicit inquiry into an organisational culture. The 
cultural elements emerged from the evidence in a relatively unstructured way. An 
alternative strategy in identifying the culture of the Air Force would have been to 
compare it in some more systematic way against one or more existing models of 
organisational cultures. The investigation of the Columbia space shuttle tragedy of 
2003 provides an excellent example37.  
 
The Columbia Board included academics with a research interest in organisational 
cultures and its inquiry was consequently a research project on the organisational 
culture of NASA. The research design involved comparing the NASA culture revealed 
in the inquiry process with other theoretical models. In the Boards words, 
 
“To develop a thorough understanding of accident causes and risk, and to better 
understand the chain of events that led to the Columbia accident, the Board turned 
to the contemporary social science literature on accidents and risk and sought 
insights from experts in High Reliability, Normal Accident, and Organisational 
Theory… Insight from each figured prominently in the Board’s deliberations… 
The Board selected certain well–known traits from these models to use as a 
yardstick to assess the Space Shuttle Program, and found them particularly useful 
in shaping its views on whether NASA’s current organisation … is appropriate.”38
 
In fact the insights on which the Board ultimately relied came almost exclusively from 
High Reliability Theory. It selected the following features of high reliability 
organisations (HROs) to be used as a standard of comparison: 
 
Commitment to a safety culture 
Ability to operate in both a centralized and decentralized manner 
Recognition of the importance of communication 
Avoidance of over-simplification 
A wariness of success 
A commitment to redundant systems 
 
There is no need to describe these features of high reliability organisations here. Suffice 
it to say that the Board found NASA lacking with respect to each of these cultural 
elements. 
 
The Board also studied some real examples of HROs, specifically the US Navy’s 
submarine and nuclear reactor safety programs39. It identified how these manifested the 
theoretical characteristics of HROs and again showed how NASA fell short.  
 
The Columbia inquiry was thus a theoretically driven inquiry into the culture of NASA. 
It is a very persuasive account, but it is not the only possible account of NASA’s 
organisational culture. Independent researchers who study the same material, but use 
different organisational models, could come up with different descriptions. Consider, 
for example, the models used by Westrum. He argues that “the most critical issue for 
organisational safety is the flow of information”40. He therefore divides organisational 
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cultures into three types, on the basis of how they process information: the 
pathological, the bureaucratic and the generative41. Without going into details here, one 
can imagine that NASA might turn out to be a combination of the pathological and 
bureaucratic. Interestingly, Vaughan describes the culture of NASA at the time to the 
Challenger disaster seventeen years earlier, as “bureaupathological”42. The point is 
simply that an inquiry driven by different theoretical concerns would generate a 
different cultural description. However, given that they are based on the same data, 
these various descriptions will presumably be consistent.  
 
The impact of organisational culture on safety 
 
The earlier mentioned methods of investigating organisational culture - the survey 
method and the ethnographic method - are carried out independently of any accident or 
accident investigation. The question of whether or how the cultures so identified impact 
on safety is a separate question. Mearns and co-workers argue that there is some, 
though rather limited, evidence that organisations which do well in safety climate 
surveys actually have fewer accidents43. The ethnographic method is not well suited to 
producing evidence about the impact on safety of the cultural elements it identifies. In 
the absence of an accident, the ethnographic method can only speculate or hypothesise 
about the impact of organisational culture on safety.  
 
Studying organisational cultures in the context of a major accident overcomes this 
difficulty. The links between the cultural elements and the outcome can usually be 
demonstrated. The formal logic involves counterfactual comparisons. If it can be 
concluded that in the absence of the cultural element concerned, the accident would not 
have occurred, or probably would not have occurred, then the cultural element can be 
counted as one of the causes of the accident. Figures 1 and 2 represent this logic. Each 
arrow is a necessary condition, or “but-for” cause, in the following sense: but for the 
matter identified at the beginning of the arrow, the outcome at the end of the arrow 
would not have occurred. The resultant chains of causation show exactly how the 
cultural elements identified in the analysis gave rise to the unwanted outcome44. The 
style of representation used here has been adapted from Rasmussen, who describes 
such diagrams as accimaps45.  
 
The sources of organisational culture 
 
It is sometimes said that the key to culture change is leadership and that safety cultures 
or generative cultures can most easily be brought about by installing leaders who have 
the appropriate vision46. But inquiries into organisational culture reveal that there are 
often less personal sources of culture which need to be understood and counteracted if 
there is to be any hope of changing the organisational culture itself. For example, some 
aspects of the culture of the organisation may be rooted in wider societal factors, such 
as the public demand that trains run on time. It may require strong pressure from other 
external sources, such as safety regulators, to ensure that this pressure does not over-
ride safety. 
 
Alternatively, culture change may depend on internal organisational change. For 
instance, the Columbia Board believed that NASA’s single-minded focus on getting on 
with the mission, regardless of safety concerns, would only be counteracted if a 
powerful Technical Engineering Authority was set up within NASA. The Authority 
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should be concerned solely with safety, it should be in no way responsible for launch 
schedules and program costs, and it should have the capacity to withhold authorization 
for launches47. The Board took this model from the US Navy which it regarded as a 
high reliability organisation. 
 
The Australian Air Force Board of Inquiry came to a very similar conclusion. It noted 
that air safety was underpinned by a powerful technical engineering authority and that 
the only way ground safety would ever achieve the same status was if there was a 
similarly powerful ground safety authority within the Air Force. 
 
The important point is that major accident research that identifies the impact of 
organisational culture on safety is likely also to provide insights into the source of that 
culture and hence ways in which it might be changed or modified. Neither the 
questionnaire technique nor the ethnographic method provide such ready insights.  
 
Some practical suggestions 
 
The previous discussion envisages the researcher drawing on the evidence of a major 
accident investigation to explore the culture of an organisation and its impact on safety. 
An obvious limitation of this method is that many organisations have not had a major 
accident or, if they have, it has not been investigated by a public inquiry in the manner 
described above. Suppose, however, we are interested in an organisation that has not 
been the subject of a public inquiry and we wish to study how aspects of the culture of 
that organisation may be affecting safety. Researchers may easily find themselves in 
such a situation especially if they engage in consultancy work. Does the preceding 
discussion of major accident inquiries provide any indication of how we might 
proceed? 
 
The data gathering process in an official inquiry is quite eclectic and relatively 
untargeted. As a result much of the information collected may turn out to be of 
relatively little use. However, since such a mass of information is collected there is still 
much that is useful. Individual researchers with limited resources, particularly limited 
time, cannot afford such an inefficient data collection strategy. They need a more 
focused strategy, one that is guided by some theory about what to look for. Moreover in 
major accident inquiries the impact of the culture on safety is relatively easy to 
demonstrate. Where research on organisational culture does not take place in the 
context of an accident investigation, the impact of elements of organisational culture on 
safety will be more difficult to demonstrate. Here again the most efficient research 
strategy is to draw on theory with a ready-made connection between culture and safety.  
 
An obvious candidate is the theory of high reliability organisations. The researcher can 
set out to examine the extent to which the organisation in question approaches the 
model of an HRO, just as the Columbia inquiry did. Weick and Sutcliffe argue that 
HROs as the following characteristics: a preoccupation with failure; a reluctance to 
simplify; a sensitivity to operations; a commitment to resilience; and deference to 
expertise48. It is clear however that studying such an array of issues is time consuming 
and will require researchers to spend long periods of time within the organisation.  
 
An alternative and more streamlined approach starts with the observation that the way 
an organisation handles information about potentially safety relevant matters is crucial 
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to safety. We have already noted Westrum’s claim that “the most critical issue for 
organisational safety is the flow of information”. Pidgeon agrees. “The heart of a safety 
culture (he says) is the way in which organisational intelligence and safety imagination 
regarding risk and danger are deployed”49. Jim Reason defines a safety culture as 
consisting of constellations of practices, most importantly, concerning reporting and 
learning. A safety culture, he argues, is both a reporting culture and a learning culture. 
Where safety is an organisation’s top priority, the organisation will aim is to assemble 
as much relevant information as possible, circulate it, analyse it, and apply. Hence, 
researchers with limited time can restrict themselves to investigating the organisation’s 
reporting practices (who reports, what get’s reported and what is done about these 
reports) and its strategies for learning from accidents, both its own and others’. Such 
research is not just about one aspect of organisational culture. As Westrum notes, 
“information flow is also a type of marker for organisational culture” more generally. 
Finally, findings about how reporting and accident investigation systems are working 
are likely to be sufficiently precise to enable comparisons to be made among 
organisations. Research focused in this way therefore has the potential to move beyond 
the case study approach to comparative analysis.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has been about strategies for studying organisational cultures and their 
effects on safety. It has argued that the debates in the safety literature about the 
meaning of terms such as culture, climate and safety culture are somewhat sterile, and 
that the more important issue is to explore the kinds of methods that are available for 
studying such phenomena. The most commonly mentioned methods are the survey 
questionnaire and the ethnography. This paper has sought to draw attention to another 
method which involves researchers immersing themselves in the mass of material 
generated by public inquiries into major accidents. Such material provides the 
researcher with such deep insights into the way an organisation thinks and acts that it 
can reasonably be described as a form of armchair ethnography. Moreover, using the 
method of counter-factual thinking, that is, imagining what would have happened had 
things been otherwise, the researcher can demonstrate quite convincingly the way 
various elements of the culture of the organisation contributed to the accident. In other 
words, taken as a whole the method allows the researcher to clarify the impact of 
various elements of organisational culture on safety. The paper concludes with some 
comments about more time-efficient strategies available to the researcher/consultant.  
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